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Bernstein: Speculative Position Limits

THE CFTC’S ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SPECULATIVE
POSITION LIMITS ON OFF-EXCHANGE SWAP CONTRACTS
LIKELY TO FACE CONTINUED LEGAL CHALLENGE
Bob Bernstein
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) is
once again seeking to enact sweeping mandatory position limits, intended to curb what it regards as “excessive speculation” in privately
negotiated swaps, involving twenty-eight different physical commodities that are traded on United States designated futures markets.1
The CFTC claims that the authority to do this is based on
amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act that were adopted as
part of the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010
(“Dodd- Frank”).2
The twenty-eight commodities that would be subject to offexchange position limits include Comex copper, silver and gold,
NYMEX gasoline, low sulfur diesel, light sweet crude, natural gas,
platinum and palladium, and a variety of agricultural products traded
on the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
and ICE Futures U.S. (cocoa, coffee, orange juice).
Excluded from the proposal are position limits for swaps in
physical commodities other than the twenty-eight commodities specifically identified, as well as swaps in non-physical commodities,
such as interest rates, foreign exchange, and commodity indices.3


Mr. Bernstein is a partner in the law firm of Eaton & Van Winkle LLP in Manhattan. He
recently represented U.S. copper fabricators opposed to the launch of new exchange traded
funds backed by physical copper. The proposals have since been withdrawn.
1
Position Limits for Derivatives, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 95 (proposed
Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalre
gister110513c.pdf (last visited May 2, 2014). This proposal was published in the Federal
Register on Nov. 15, 2013.
2
15 U.S.C § 8302 (2010).
3
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 18 n.49. As proposed, it would appear
that swaps denominated in contracts traded in the United States on foreign boards of trade,
such as the London Metal Exchange, where most metal futures in the United States are actu-
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A position limit caps the maximum number of derivative contracts to purchase (long) or sell (short) that an individual trader or
group of traders may own during a given period.4 The proposed limits would cap the number of such contracts a trader may hold in both
the spot month, which is a specific period of time that immediately
precedes the date of delivery of the commodity under the derivatives
contract and in non-spot months, by capping the total number of contracts that expire in periods further in the future or in all months
combined.5
Here, the CFTC is proposing that position limits in the spot
month for each such commodity should generally be limited to 25%
of the estimated deliverable supply of that commodity, which is defined as the amount of such physical commodity that can reasonably
be expected to be available to accommodate a short seller needing to
make physical delivery.6 That would include the amount of such
physical commodity actually stored in any exchange warehouse designated for such delivery, plus anything else that could reasonably be
expected to arrive in time to meet a delivery obligation that month.7
In the non-spot months, the CFTC is proposing to limit the
ally traded, would be exempt from CFTC position limits. The LME operates without position limits. It, therefore, follows that one of the unintended consequences of the CFTC proposal may be to give competing exchanges that operate in the United States as foreign
boards of trade a competitive advantage over their Unites States competitors by ensuring
their futures markets operate with far greater liquidity. In recognition of this possibility,
Dodd-Frank says the CFTC “shall strive to ensure that trading on foreign boards of trade in
the same commodity will be subject to comparable limits and that any limits to be imposed
by the Commission will not cause price discovery in the commodity to shift to trading on the
foreign boards of trade.” 7 U.S.C. § 6a(2)(C). The CFTC does not appear to have addressed
the issue at this time.
However, efforts are underway in the European Union to adopt comparable position limits to curb so-called “excessive speculation.” In January 2014, the European Parliament approved the concept of position limits, but the determination of what those limits will be,
what underlying products will be covered, whether such limits will be applicable to offexchange as well as exchange-traded derivatives, and what exemptions will be available for
hedging purposes, are all still to be negotiated, and there is no assurance such regulations
will be applicable or acceptable by all countries in the European Union, including in particular in the United Kingdom. Jim Brunsden, EU Reins In High-Frequency Traders to Commodity Speculators, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://washpost.bloomberg.com
/Story?docId=1376-MZEW996K50YR01-18HPPOQQOIB6AK99QAVN6G50NS.
4
17 C.F.R. § 150.2 (2012).
5
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 301-02.
6
CME GROUP, CONDITIONAL SPOT-MONTH SPECULATIVE LIMIT PROPOSAL (2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmissio
n_080211_964_0.pdf.
7
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 170-71.
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number of contracts a speculator may acquire in a single month, or in
the aggregate, to 2.5% of the open interest in such contracts up to the
first 25,000 contracts and 1.2% of the excess above 25,000 contracts.8
The first question one might well ask is whether sweeping
new rules to combat off-exchange “excessive speculation” are even
needed. There were numerous events that led to the economic crisis
in 2008 and subsequent passage of the Dodd Frank Act, 9 but on or
off-exchange “excessive speculation” in commodities is not usually
identified as one of them.10
The next question is whether these new rules are likely to
withstand judicial review if, as the CFTC maintains in its latest public
filing, there is no obligation to demonstrate that these new rules are
even necessary much less demonstrate through any quantitative analysis that their putative benefits outweigh the costs.11
Thus, the Commission stated in its latest notice that “it is reasonable to conclude from the Dodd-Frank amendments that Congress
mandated limits and did not intend for the Commission to make a necessity finding as a prerequisite to the imposition of limits.”12
At issue here is the entire concept in the United States of “excessive speculation.”13 Those who favor imposing these sweeping
new position limits believe, as a matter of faith, that “excess” speculation in futures markets artificially inflates prices for the physical
commodities underlying those trades, thereby burdening interstate
commerce in the United States.14 They point to examples in history

8

Id. at 178.
YU GAO ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DODD FRANK ACT OF 2010: EVIDENCE
FROM MARKET REACTIONS TO EVENTS SURROUNDING THE PASSAGE OF THE ACT 6-7 (2011),
available at http://business.rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty_and_Research/Academic_Areas/
Accounting/papers/Wang_Paper.pdf.
10
Id. at 14.
11
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808, 5813 (Jan. 31,
2014).
12
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 11; id. at 21-22 (“Because of this mandate, the Commission need not make a prerequisite finding that such limits are necessary ‘to
diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the prices of’ commodities under pre-Dodd Frank CEA section 4a(a)(1).”).
13
7 U.S.C. § 6a (2010). The same can be said of the concept in Europe, which, like the
United States, is also proposing position limits to combat “excessive speculation.”
14
CME GROUP, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION AND POSITION LIMITS IN ENERGY DERIVATIVES
MARKETS 1, 9 (2013), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/company/files/PositionLimits
WhitePaper.pdf.
9
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where this supposedly occurred.15 The theory is that excessive speculation may result in the concentration of ownership of “open interest”
in spot and more thinly-traded future delivery months which could
give one or more of such dominant traders in such contract markets
the ability to keep prices artificially high by outbidding other market
participants whose trading might result in prices that more accurately
reflect the actual supply and demand of the underlying commodity.16
By contrast, those opposed to the new limits believe there is
no such thing as “excessive speculation” in futures markets because
for every speculator who bets aggressively that prices are going up,
there must be other speculators willing to take the opposite bet.17
Thus, absent concerted activity among competing speculators, which
is already illegal under United States commodity and antitrust laws,18
non-collusive “excessive speculation”—however the government defines it—cannot alter the fundamental laws of supply and demand
which actually dictate the price of underlying physical commodities,
no matter how much “excess” speculation may take place in a given
contract market.19 Thus, to their way of thinking, “excessive speculation” not only cannot cause artificially inflated prices, it defies logic
and common sense even to think that it might.
Furthermore, as far as history is concerned, any so-called incidents of “excessive speculation” involving concerted activity
among competing speculators are already illegal and do not need position limits to police in any event because conspirators would evade
them.20 Alternatively, they involved actions by a single speculator
whose aggressive trading, either going too long or too short, are
matched by equally aggressive trading on the other side. 21 This is
consistent with what efficient markets are supposed to do; effectively
tame any artificially inflated prices which again, are determined not
by speculators betting too much one way or the other, but by the rela15

Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 32-34.
Id. at 34.
17
FIA Letter to Commodities Futures Trading Commission (Feb. 7, 2014), at 11, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/FIA_Position_Limits_Comment_Letter_02
0714.pdf.
18
Id. at attachment A.
19
Id. at 2.
20
15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.”); see 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(1).
21
See infra note 74, p. 114 and Part IV.
16
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tive balance of supply and demand of the underlying physical commodity.22
The CFTC’s sweeping new proposal was announced on November 15, 2013 in a notice of proposed rulemaking.23 Final comments on the proposal were due January 14, 2014, and the CFTC will
announce its Final Decision in the coming weeks.24 As this article
will demonstrate, however, the legality of the CFTC’s bold move in
this direction is not free from doubt, and should the CFTC again
stumble, efforts to impose position limits in Europe, which appears
critical to the success of the United States effort, may suffer a similar
fate.
I.

CFTC RULEMAKING REFLECTS SECOND ATTEMPT TO
ESTABLISH POSITION LIMITS

This is the second time the CFTC is trying to get these position limits enacted25 and it is a virtual certainty that the legality of
these new rules will be challenged in legal proceedings that may
eventually reach the United States Supreme Court.
The CFTC’s first effort ended in failure after two trade
groups, the International Swap Dealers Association and the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association, successfully challenged
the rules in federal district court in Washington.26
The heart of their challenge was that the CFTC misinterpreted
its statutory authority under the CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank.27
The district court opinion, by Judge Robert L. Wilkins, an Obama
appointee who was one of the president’s three successful nominees
to the D.C. Court of Appeals that Republican senators tried so hard
last fall to block, is startling in its recitation of facts showing that not
even members of the CFTC were confident that these sweeping new

22

How
Supply
and
Demand
Determine
Commodities
Market
Prices,
TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://futures.tradingcharts.com/learning/supply_and_demand.html
(last visited May 2, 2014).
23
Proposed Rules, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://comments.cftc.go
v/FederalRegister/Proposed.aspx?Type=ListAll&Year=2013 (last visited May 2, 2014).
24
Id.
25
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 9-10.
26
See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. United States Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012).
27
Id. at 279-80.
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position limits were necessary or warranted.28
Thus, before vacating the CFTC’s first attempt to impose these position limits, Judge Wilkins noted that the rules were originally
adopted by the agency on October 18, 2011 by a three-to-two vote
and that one of those voting in favor, along with Chairman Gary
Gensler and Commissioner Bart Chilton, was Commissioner Michael
V. Dunn, who admitted several months before, when the proposed
rules were still pending, that “to date CFTC staff has been unable to
find any reliable economic analysis to support either the contention
that excessive speculation is affecting the market we regulate or that
position limits will prevent excessive speculation.”29 The opinion
further notes that “Dunn also shared his ‘fear’ that ‘at best position
limits are a cure for a disease that does not exist, or at worst it’s a
placebo for one that does,’ ” adding that “position limits may harm
the very markets we’re intended to protect.”30
The court focused on Dunn’s views because, as the deciding
vote in favor of the new rules, Dunn’s quandary was not unlike the
court’s. Thus, Dunn voted in favor of the rule not because he believed they made sense or were grounded in empirical evidence
demonstrating their necessity, but because he believed Congress had
required them to do it.31
Position limits are, in my opinion, a sideshow that has
unnecessarily diverted human and fiscal resources
away from actions to prevent another financial crisis.
To be clear, no one has proven that the looming specter of excessive speculation in the futures market reregulated even exist, let alone played any role whatsoever in the financial crisis of 2008. Even so, Congress
has tasked the CFTC with preventing excessive speculation by imposing position limits. This is the law.
The law is clear and I will follow the law.32
Even Chairman Gensler was defensive, saying that the final
rule reflected the Commission’s view that it was compelled to produce a certain result: “Congress did not give the Commission a
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 262-63.
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/5

6

Bernstein: Speculative Position Limits

2014]

SPECULATIVE POSITION LIMITS

567

choice. Congress directed the Commission to impose position limits
and to do so expeditiously.”33
Not surprisingly, the two dissenting commissioners, each of
whom published written dissents, were less kind. Commissioner
Sommers warned that the rule “would inflict the greatest harm on bona fide hedgers and ‘ironically’ may ‘result in increased food and energy costs for consumers,’ ” adding that the CFTC had “created a
very complicated regulation that has the potential to irreparably harm
these vital markets,” while setting the agency up “for an enormous
failure.”34
For his part, Commissioner O’Malia criticized the agency’s
reading of the Dodd Frank amendments to the CEA, insisting that in
the context of the Act, the CFTC’s discretion is “broad enough to
permit the Commission to not impose limits if they are not appropriate” and that the CFTC had “miss[ed] an opportunity to determine
and define the type and extent of speculation that is likely to cause
sudden, unreasonable and/or unwarranted commodity price movements so that it can respond with rules that are reasonable and appropriate.”35 “O’Malia also faulted the Commission for promulgating
position limits without any evidence that such limits would actually
benefit the market.”36
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS

Faced with diametrically opposed views as to whether Congress actually mandated position limits without regard to whether the
agency charged with enforcing them felt they were needed, the Court
employed the Supreme Court’s two-part Chevron test.37
Under step one of Chevron, the Court first must consider
33

Id. at 264.
Id. Under the proposed new regulations, bona fide hedgers are expected to apply for
and receive hedge exemptions. However, the concern is that hedgers might not qualify for
or receive in a timely manner all of the exemptions they may need which, were that to occur,
would create a market in which already-issued hedge exemptions are themselves traded, with
those who don’t need them selling them at a premium to those who do, with the added costs
then passed on to consumers. In exchange markets where position limits and hedge exemptions are already commonplace, such trading already takes place.
35
Id.
36
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
37
See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(testing whether congressional language directly addresses a regulatory issue, under de novo
review, and then assessing an agency’s construction of the statute if an ambiguity is present).
34
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whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue
because, if so, the Court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”38 “Under Chevron Step
One, the Court examines the statute de novo, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction” to “search for the plain meaning of
the statute.”39
If the statute is found to be “silent or ambiguous,” the Court
moves on to Chevron step two and defers to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.40
Here, Judge Wilkins began with Section 6a(a)(1) of the CEA,
which was amended by Dodd-Frank to broaden its scope to include
not just exchange-traded futures, but off-exchange swaps that “perform[] a significant price discovery function.”41 Section 6a(a)(1) of
the CEA has been a part of United States law in one form or another
since 1936, when the idea of requiring position limits to combat “excessive speculation” in futures markets first arose.42
That provision, the court said, unambiguously requires the
Commission to find that position limits are necessary prior to imposing them.43 Thus, Section 6a(a)(1) states in pertinent part:
For the purpose of diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing such burden [on interstate commerce
caused by excessive speculation], the Commission
shall, from time to time, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, by rule, regulation, or order, proclaim and fix such limits on the amounts of trading
which may be done or positions which may be held by
any person . . . as the Commission finds are necessary
to diminish, eliminate, or prevent such burden.44
Based on this language, Judge Wilkins held that the CEA requires the CFTC to make a finding of necessity prior to imposing position limits, which it did not do, and is not doing now.45 So why did
38

Id. at 842-43.
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
40
Id. at 280.
41
Id. at 269.
42
Id. at 269-70.
43
Id. at 269.
44
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6a (a)(1)
(2010)) (emphasis added).
45
Id. at 270.
39
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that not end the matter? The answer is that the CFTC and many
Democrats in Congress believe other Dodd Frank amendments to the
CEA effectively eliminated the necessity requirement.46
First the agency points to Section 6a(a)(2), which states that
“[i]n accordance with the standards set forth in paragraph (1) of this
subsection . . . the Commission shall by rule, regulation, or order establish limits on the amount of positions . . . .”47 However, because
Congress incorporated by reference the term “standards” in the immediately preceding paragraph, Judge Wilkins held that the term
“standards”, which is nowhere mentioned expressly in paragraph 1,
could either refer to the threshold requirement that the agency must
first find position limits to be “necessary” or it could refer to some
other standards.48 Hence the statute was ambiguous. Because the
agency didn’t bother to “interpret” the ambiguity, as required by
Chevron part two, the Court had no choice but to issue an order vacating the rules, which it did.49
Judge Wilkins also found other ambiguities in Dodd Frank’s
amendments to the CEA. Section 6a(a)(2)(A) not only directed the
CFTC to establish position limits in accordance with the unspecified
“standards” in subparagraph 1, which may or may not refer to the
need to determine whether such limits are even necessary, but it also
directed the CFTC to establish such position limits “as appropriate.”50
The “as appropriate” language also appears in Section 6a(a)(3),
which deals with fixing position limits in both the spot month and for
all months combined, and in Section 6a(a)(5)(A), which states generally that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section, the
Commission shall establish limits on the amount of positions, including aggregate position limits, as appropriate . . . .”51
Here, too, the court found the “as appropriate” language to be
ambiguous.52 Thus, in the absence of any language expressly repealing the requirement from 1936 that position limits must first be premised on a finding of necessity, which Congress could easily have done
but chose not to do when it passed Dodd Frank in 2010, it was un46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 263.
Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
Id. at 275.
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 276 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6a (a)(5)(A)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 276.
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clear whether the language in subsequent sections mandating position
limits in accordance with prior “standards” and “as appropriate” was
intended to jettison the requirement for a necessity finding or whether
these words were intended to mean something else.53 In accordance
with Chevron part two, in the absence of any interpretation from the
agency to review, the court had no choice to but vacate.54
While the court’s ruling was pending, the CFTC announced
its intention to withdraw the rules and replace them with a new proposal.55 By taking that step, the CFTC effectively prevented Judge
Wilkins from going any further in his ruling and determining whether
the rules then under challenge were arbitrary and capricious.
However, Judge Wilkins made clear that in construing the
statute, he is required to construe the statute as a whole, including the
provision requiring a finding of necessity before position limits are
established, and that the CFTC’s efforts to find mandatory language
compelling the adoption of position limits in certain sections, without
also taking into account the just-as-lawful opposite mandate in the
section of the CEA dating back to 1936 which required a showing of
necessity, would be unavailing.56
The court also warned the CFTC that its attempt to satisfy
Chevron part two would be entitled to no deference if, in conducting
its analysis of the apparent ambiguities in the CEA as a result of the
Dodd Frank amendments, it appeared the agency continued to believe
that the mandate to establish position limits without a finding of necessity was clear and unambiguous.57
Significantly, in light of the partisan political acrimony between Congressional Democrats and Republicans that followed passage of Dodd Frank, as well as the controversy surrounding Judge
Wilkins’ recent Senate confirmation to serve on the appeals court,58 it
53

Id. at 277-78.
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
55
Michael R. Sorrell et al., CFTC Proposes Speculative Position Limits Again, MONDAQ
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/276994/Commodities+Derivative
s+Stock+Exchanges/CFTC+Proposes+Speculative+Position+Limits+Again.
56
“Although the CFTC is correct that these provisions taken in isolation seemingly create
a mandatory regime, the agency and this Court is required to attempt to give effect to all
parts of the statute, including the ambiguous language.” Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n,
887 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
57
Id. at 280-81.
58
Michael R. Crittenden, Senate Confirms Judge Wilkins to Key Federal Appeals Court,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819
704579319153037797452.
54
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is worth noting that Judge Wilkins flatly rejected the views filed in
amici briefs by the House Democratic Conference Committee, and by
nineteen United States Senators, respectively.59
III.

THE CFTC’S NOVEMBER 15, 2013 PROPOSAL

In its proposed new rules, the CFTC spends considerable effort addressing the issues raised by Judge Wilkins. First, the agency
purports to interpret the ambiguities identified by Judge Wilkins in
the CEA, as amended by Dodd Frank, and not surprisingly concludes
that, based on its knowledge and experience as the agency charged
with enforcing position limits, Congress really did mandate offexchange position limits without any finding of necessity. 60 Alternatively, in the event the court rejects the CFTC’s analysis, the CFTC
includes for the first time a necessity finding.61
As indicated, final comments on the CFTC’s notice of proposed rulemaking were due February 10, 2014.62 After reviewing the
comments, the CFTC will issue its final rule, which will almost certainly be challenged, perhaps by the same parties as the last time and
perhaps others.63 Assuming the CFTC still insists on pushing ahead
with the limits, and there is every indication that it will, it is by no
means clear that the CFTC will prevail.
Specifically, the CFTC stated on November 15, 2013, “based
on its experience and expertise, when [the positions limits section of
the CEA] is considered as an integrated whole, it is reasonable to
construe that section to mandate that the Commission impose position limits” on futures contracts, options, and certain swaps for all
twenty-eight physical commodities, and “[t]he Commission also conclude[d] that the mandate requires it to impose such limits without
first finding that any such limit is necessary to prevent excessive
speculation in a particular market.”64
However, nowhere in its analysis did the CFTC really do
what Judge Wilkins had asked, which was to square on one hand the

59

Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83.
See generally Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 9-13.
61
Id. at 21-22.
62
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://comments.cftc.gov/FederalRegist
er/Proposed.aspx?Type=ListAll&Year=2013 (last visited May 2, 2014).
63
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 93, 113-14.
64
Id. at 9.
60
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clear and unambiguous mandate in the CEA, dating back to 1936 requiring the CFTC to determine that position limits in specific contract
markets are actually needed before ordering them, with the more ambiguous Dodd Frank language added to the CEA requiring that the
CFTC impose position limits in accordance with certain unspecified
“standards” that must be met before position limits may be imposed,
and the further ambiguous requirement in several subsections that
such new position limits be imposed “as necessary.”65
Instead, the CFTC concluded that because the Dodd Frank
amendments called for new position limits to be implemented relatively quickly, i.e., within 180 days from enactment of Dodd Frank
for metals and energy and within 270 days from enactment for agricultural products, Congress “did not intend for the Commission to
make a necessity finding as a prerequisite to the imposition of limits”
because there wouldn’t be enough time to make the required findings
in each of the twenty-eight physical commodities covered.66
Besides, the CFTC said, Congress did its own studies.67 Here,
the CFTC cited work done several years before by staff members
working for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.68
These reports, the CFTC said, “concluded that excessive speculation
accounted for significant volatility and price increases in physical
commodity markets.”69
In fact, there were only two such investigations. The first,
conducted in 2006, dealt with increases in the price of crude oil, in
which subcommittee staff found evidence suggesting that speculation
was responsible for an increase of as much as $20-25 per barrel of
crude oil, which was then at $70.70 The theory was that speculators
were driving up the price of crude oil for future delivery and that oil
65

Id. at 11.
Id. at 10-11.
67
Id. at 11-12.
68
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12 nn.23-25. In his opening remarks
on November 5, 2013, the day the CFTC approved the “revised” form of position limits,
Chairman Gensler praised the work done for the agency by its former general counsel, Dan
Berkovitz. Prior to joining the CFTC as general counsel, Mr. Berkovitz worked for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations where he was responsible for the work staff
members did on excessive speculation. Id. at 522-23.
69
Id. at 11.
70
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN
RISING OIL & GAS PRICES: A NEED TO PUT THE COP BACK ON THE BEAT, S. REP. NO. 109-65,
at 2 (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT28640/pdf/CPRT109SPRT28640.pdf.
66
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producers, in an effort to cash in on the speculative bonanza for them
in the futures market, hoarded their oil so as to create an artificial
shortage and take advantage of the higher prices.71
There are several problems with this analysis. First, it assumes that all competing oil producers act like the oil cartel OPEC.
But, there is in fact no evidence that competing oil producing companies are members of a cartel and would, as cartel members, willingly
withhold oil from the market and forego immediate profits in the
hope of getting even higher profits down the road. However, absent
such collusion among competing oil producing companies, which
would be illegal, it would be very difficult and expensive for individual competitors to withhold oil or oil products from the market in the
hope of driving up the price.72 Even if they wanted to withhold their
product from the market, the ability of oil producers to store crude oil
once removed from the ground is limited. Oil, once pumped out of
the ground, is generally transported to oil refineries around the world.
Thus, assuming no actual change in physical supply or demand, any
increase in the price of oil attributable to “excess speculation” in the
futures markets would appear to be short lived. Indeed, absent any
perceptible change in anticipated supply or demand, speculators who
bid up the price of oil would be met with speculators convinced there
is no basis for such higher prices who would just as quickly bid the
price down.
The problem, of course, is that not everyone may agree on the
future course of physical supply and demand. Thus, increases in the
price of crude oil during the period of time that subcommittee staff
was examining could just as easily be attributable not so much to
“excess speculation,” however that term is defined, but to anticipated

71

Id.
The NYMEX futures contract for gasoline (reformulated gasoline) calls for delivery to
New York Harbor. The contract is based on barrels, and there are 42,000 gallons to a barrel.
If a speculator wanted to hoard gasoline for the purpose of driving up its price, i.e., squeeze
the market, it would first have to buy up nearby long positions in such gasoline; then, rather
than cash settle such positions, it would take physical delivery of the product in New York
and, rather than sell it in the ordinary course or otherwise make it available to short sellers to
cover their positions, the speculator could thereby effectively squeeze the market. The problem is that New York Harbor can store as much as seventy-five million barrels of gasoline.
To corner the market would require acquiring a substantial amount of such storage. At $3
per gallon of gasoline, the cost to engineer a squeeze in New York Harbor would be astronomical, (e.g., 42,000 x $2 x 50,000,000 barrels) before adding in the costs of storage and
insurance. In any event, the exercise is largely academic because NYMEX has long had position limits of its own on energy products.
72
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increases in demand for oil from China, whose economy during the
period studied was experiencing unprecedented growth.73 Obviously,
if the market guesses wrong about a major factor such as Chinese
demand, prices will experience volatility, but there is nothing in the
CFTC discussion that explains how subcommittee staffers were able
to conclude the crude oil market would move substantially up or
down because of “excess speculation” or because of new information,
which may bear on the future direction of prices.
The second Congressional study cited by the CFTC, as proof
of Congressional intent that no finding of necessity to combat “excess
speculation” was needed, was a report by the same Congressional
subcommittee in 2007 concerning natural gas.74 All the CFTC says
about that study is that “Congress found similar price volatility
stemming from excess speculation in the natural gas market.”75 In
fact, the natural gas report dealt largely with a single hedge fund that,
in the summer of 2006, purchased an unusually large number of natural gas futures contracts for winter delivery, and in so doing, bid up
the price.76 However, because traders saw no fundamental change in
expected supply or demand for natural gas, other hedge funds quickly
realized that prices for such delivery were too high.77 Accordingly,
they began to sell short, thus bidding the price for winter delivery
down.78 As a result, when prices declined, the company that bet prices would rise had to pay margin calls, and because the volume of
their positions was so large, the margins calls effectively forced the
fund out of business.79 In the meantime, prices returned fairly quickly to where the market believed they should have been in the first
place.80
Nevertheless, based on these two subcommittee reports, the
CFTC said Congress “had already gathered evidence regarding the
impact of excessive speculation, and had concluded that such speculation imposed an undue burden on the economy[,]” and that “[i]n
73

S. REP. NO. 109-65, at 10 (2006).
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL
GAS MARKET. (2007), available at https://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/
2007/PSI.Amaranth.062507.pdf.
75
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12.
76
EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, supra note 74, at 51-52.
77
Id. at 53.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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light of these investigations and conclusions, it is reasonable for the
Commission to conclude that Congress did not intend for it to duplicate investigations Congress had already conducted, and did not intend to leave it up to the Commission whether there should be federal
limits.”81
In short, based on these two Congressional staff reports, the
CFTC has concluded that, based on its own experience, it is reasonable to interpret the Dodd Frank amendments to the CEA as not only
mandating speculative position limits in privately negotiated swaps
involving twenty-eight different physical commodities, but impliedly
also reading out of the CEA entirely the otherwise unambiguous requirement, dating back to 1936, that any federally imposed position
limit must be preceded by an agency finding that “such limit is necessary to prevent excessive speculation in a particular market.”82
In addition to the Congressional staff reports, the CFTC also
said it was relying on a 1981 CFTC rule that required United States
futures markets to adopt “speculative position limits for ‘for each
separate [futures] contract for which delivery months are listed to
trade.’ ”83 The 1981 rule specified the criteria for determining how
the required limits would be set, but did not include the antecedent
judgment of whether to order limits at all.84 In short, the CFTC ordered speculative position limits to be established for all United
States exchanged traded futures – but it did so without any showing
of excessive speculation or other burdens on the market.85 Thus, the
CFTC’s argument here is that because it dispensed with the 1981
statutory prerequisite for imposing position limits, and no one at the
time challenged the CFTC’s having done so, it is just as reasonable
for the CFTC to dispense with the same statutory prerequisite in expanding the scope of its authority to cover all privately negotiated
swaps that effectively function like exchange-traded futures.86
Finally, the CFTC concludes that Congress impliedly dispensed with the statutory prerequisite for making contract-bycontract findings because one of the Dodd Frank amendments requires the CFTC to conduct a study of the effects, if any, of the limits
81
82
83
84
85
86

Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 17.
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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it establishes – once the limits have been in effect.87 Here, the CFTC
argues that Congress would not have required them to conduct a second study if it wasn’t dispensing altogether with the statutory mandate requiring a study before any position limits are imposed.88
Of course, the CFTC’s argument still leaves open the question
of why, if Congress was dispensing with an unambiguous statutorilymandated finding of necessity dating back to the 1930s, it didn’t
come right out in Dodd Frank and say so. Here, the CFTC argues
that because the Dodd Frank position limits apply only to physical
commodities (and thus exempt such things as interest rate and currency futures, which are always cash-settled and thus never settled by
physical delivery), the statutory necessity findings are still applicable
here – in that narrow context.89 Hence, the CFTC argues, there was
no need for Congress to repeal the need for a necessity finding.90
However, the CFTC did not point to any language in Dodd
Frank’s legislative history to suggest that Congress was intending to
do any such thing. That brings us back to the CFTC’s overall experience as the agency charged with enforcement of the antimanipulation provisions of the CEA. However, the CFTC cites nothing in its experience enforcing the CEA that would support any finding that Congress wanted to preserve the legislative prerequisite of a
finding of “need” before imposing position limits for off-exchange
futures contracts that did not require physical delivery.
Thus, if “excessive speculation” could drive up interest rates
and foreign currency just as easily as it could drive up the price of
physical commodities, why then would Congress dispense with a
finding of necessity for futures trading involving physical commodities, and not dispense with such a finding for such things as interest
rates and foreign currency? Absent any experience by which the
CFTC could draw a conclusion one way or the other, it would appear
that the CFTC’s rationale may be deemed sufficiently arbitrary so as
not to pass legal muster.

87
88
89
90

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19-21.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/5

16

Bernstein: Speculative Position Limits

2014]
IV.

SPECULATIVE POSITION LIMITS

577

AS A FALL BACK, THE CFTC MAKES A “NECESSITY”
FINDING

Given the apparent weakness of its position, it is not surprising that the CFTC has also embraced a fallback position, i.e., it goes
on to say in its proposed new regulations, that even if a necessity
finding is required, “out of an abundance of caution in light of the
district court decision,” it is now making one.91 However, the
CFTC’s finding on that score may be just as weak as its statutory interpretation.
As indicated above, since 1936, the CEA (or its predecessor)
has required that before speculative position limits may be imposed,
there must first be a “finding that such limits are necessary ‘to diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the prices of’
commodities.”92
Here, the Commission asserts that speculative position limits
are “necessary as a prophylactic measure” for two reasons.93 First,
“to lessen the likelihood that a trader will accumulate excessively
large speculative positions that can result in corners, squeezes, or
other forms of manipulation that cause unwarranted or unreasonable
price fluctuations.”94 And second, they are also necessary because
“even if not accompanied by manipulative conduct” “excessively
large speculative positions may cause sudden or unreasonable price
fluctuations.”95
To support the first prong of its findings, the CFTC cites the
1979-80 cornering of the silver market by the Hunt Brothers.96 The
story is not new or novel. The Hunts conspired to corner the silver
market by buying up long silver positions, taking delivery on those
positions and, by creating an actual shortage of physical silver in the
market, forcing short sellers of silver to pay artificially high prices to
close out their positions.97
In other words, the Hunt Brothers and their co-conspirators
did not just speculate excessively in the futures market, they altered
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 21-22.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
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the fundamental rules of physical supply and demand of the underlying physical commodity by hoarding silver that would otherwise have
been available to short sellers and industrial users, thus forcing up
prices artificially.98 When the government figured out what the
Hunts and their co-conspirators were doing, position limits were imposed, thus forcing the Hunts to give up the squeeze, which caused
prices to plummet.99
There is no question that the Hunt Brothers and their coconspirators engaged in a conspiracy to artificially inflate the price of
silver. Their conduct was found to be a violation of not just the antimanipulation provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, but the
United States antitrust laws, i.e., Section 1 of the Sherman Act.100
But nowhere does the Commission demonstrate how position
limits, had they been in effect in 1979 and 1980, would have worked
to prevent the conspiracy. The existence of position limits might
have made it harder to manipulate the price of silver, but no one can
demonstrate that the conspiracy would not have occurred. At the
heart of the Hunt conspiracy, as well as just about every other conspiracy, is secrecy. What made the Hunt conspiracy work was the
fact that the Hunts had secretly lined up confederates that they knew
would join with them in buying up long silver positions, taking physical delivery, and squeezing the shorts.101
Thus, had position limits been in effect, the conspirators
would have simply evaded them, just as they tried to evade the CEA
and the United States antitrust laws.102 The CFTC thus makes no
demonstration in its sixteen pages of discussion that had position limits been in effect, no such conspiracy would have been possible.
Instead, the CFTC quotes a report prepared by the “staffs” of
the CFTC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Department of the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission that “reasonable speculative position limits, [had they]
been in place before the buildup of large positions occurred, would
have helped prevent the accumulation of such large positions and the
resultant dislocations created when the holders of those positions

98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
See Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 25.
Minpeco, 718 F. Supp. at 170.
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stood for delivery.”103 That is, according to the CFTC “speculative
position limits would have helped to prevent the buildup of the silver
price spike of 1979-80.”104
To support that conclusion, the CFTC points to the fact that
by late 1979, when the Chicago Board of Trade imposed position
limits and raised margin requirements, long positions had to be liquidated, which resulted, not surprisingly, in the short squeeze abruptly
coming to an end.105
But what the CFTC nowhere tries to show is how, in the teeth
of a secret conspiracy to fix prices, the existence of speculative position limits would somehow act as a deterrent. Instead, the Commission states, “if Federal speculative position limits had been in effect
that correspond to the limits that the Commission proposes now,
across markets now subject to Commission jurisdiction, such limits
would have prevented the Hunt brothers and their cohorts from accumulating such large futures positions.”106 In short, the CFTC relies
on its own ipse dixit.
The CFTC then argues that position limits are still needed as a
prophylactic to prevent “excessive speculation,” even in the absence
of manipulative behavior.107 Here, the Commission relies in part on a
staff report prepared by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation,108 which in 2007 looked into the behavior of Amaranth
Advisors LLC, the hedge fund that collapsed in September 2006 after
building up that summer an unusually large long position in natural
gas futures for delivery that winter,109 a CFTC enforcement action
against Amaranth,110 and a still pending enforcement action against
Amaranth’s former head energy trader.111
Unlike the Hunt Brothers, Amaranth did not conspire with
anyone; nor did it take physical delivery of any physical commodity
in an attempt to engineer a corner or a short squeeze. Indeed, Amaranth did not engage in any manipulative behavior at all.
103

Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 24.
Id.
105
Id. at 26.
106
Id. at 35.
107
Id. at 22.
108
See generally EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, supra note 74.
109
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 111-360,
at 143 (2010).
110
Id. at 145.
111
Id.
104
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Instead, Amaranth, which could neither make nor take delivery of physical natural gas, made a very large bet in the summer of
2006 that the spread between natural gas prices for delivery that winter and summer would be far greater than usual.112
Amaranth engaged in spread trading. Spread trading is a trading strategy often employed in commodities where prices vary seasonally.113 A spread trader bets not so much on the absolute price of
the commodity going up in winter – everyone expects that it will go
up in winter and down in summer – but rather on the amount of the
actual spread between the prices in different months. Thus, Amaranth would sell short natural gas in delivery months where it believed prices would actually go lower and at the same time it would
go long in delivery months where it believed prices would actually go
higher. If it guessed right in both legs of the trade, it would have a
substantial gain.
Amaranth’s bet in 2006 was quite large.
During the spring and summer of 2006, Amaranth controlled between 25 and 48% of the outstanding contracts . . . in all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts
for 2006; about 30% of the outstanding contracts . . . in
all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2007; between 25 and 40% of the outstanding contracts . . . in
all NYMEX natural gas futures controls for 2008; between 20 and 40% of the outstanding contracts . . . in
all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2009; and
about 60% of the outstanding contracts . . . in all
NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2010.114
The senate subcommittee staff found that Amaranth’s large
positions resulted in “significant price movements in key natural gas
futures prices and price relationships” and that they were a “predominant cause” of an increasing price spread between summer and winter
contracts.115 In other words, the committee concluded that the huge
concentration of ownership of open interest in natural gas futures
contracts by Amaranth was itself the cause of prices being artificially
112

Id. at 167.
Adam Milton, Spread Trading, ABOUT.COM (last visited May 2, 2014),
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stou/g/SpreadTrading.htm.
114
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 41 n.107.
115
S. REP. NO. 111-360, at 167 (2010).
113
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inflated.116
The CFTC then cited the senate subcommittee’s conclusion
that “purchasers of natural gas during the summer of 2006 for delivery in the following winter months paid inflated prices due to Amaranth’s speculative trading,” and that “many of these inflated costs
were passed on to consumers, including residential users who paid
higher home heating bills[, and that s]uch inflated costs [we]re clearly a burden on interstate commerce.”117
However, if Amaranth’s trading single-handedly caused natural gas futures prices for winter delivery to rise artificially, i.e., to a
level not warranted by anticipated physical supply and demand, then
it stands to reason that other traders in the market would see this as an
opportunity to sell short an overpriced asset, and thereby quickly
force these prices down to where they should be, with no one other
than Amaranth getting hurt, which appears to be exactly what happened.
Neither the senate subcommittee staffers nor the CFTC seem
to allow for this possibility. The subcommittee report states:
Amaranth had held as many as 100,000 natural gas
contracts in a single month, representing . . . 5 percent
of the natural gas used in the entire United States in a
year. At times Amaranth controlled 40 percent of all
of the outstanding contacts in the NYMEX exchange
for natural gas in the winter season (October 2006
through March 2007), including as much as 75 percent
of the outstanding contracts to deliver natural gas in
November 2006.118
The implication is that excessive amounts of futures contracts were to
blame.
However, there was plenty of evidence that Amaranth had
simply made the wrong bet. Like all commodities, the price of natural gas depends on relative supply and demand. Heading into the
winter season, traders look to see how much natural gas is in storage
and whether the forecast that winter is for a cold or a mild winter. If
the amount of gas in storage is greater than expected, and the winter
is predicted to be mild then prices will tend to come down because of
116
117
118

Id.
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 42.
S. Rep. No. 111-360, at 167 (2010).
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the expectation that supplies for the coming winter will be abundant.
On the other hand, because most natural gas stored in the
United States is in facilities that are prone to destruction in the event
of a hurricane,119 the possibility of one or more bad hurricanes, combined with a winter predicted to be colder than normal, would tend to
force prices up.
Here, Amaranth, made a large bet that natural gas prices
would rise, and the market evidence in September 2006, when Amaranth reportedly lost $6 billion on its natural gas positions, was that
there was not only ample storage, but that forecasters were expecting
both a mild hurricane season and a mild winter as well. Not surprisingly, hedge funds seeing that same data would conclude that natural
gas prices for delivery that winter were too high and would look to
enter into short positions. Because these positions are traded on the
NYMEX, no one has to target Amaranth as such, although it was
probably the case that most savvy traders knew Amaranth was responsible for driving up the prices and that such increases were not
supported by market fundamentals. But it did not take much to drive
the prices back down and it was the resulting margin calls necessitated by a drop in price that caused Amaranth’s collapse.
So, what then to make of the CFTC’s conclusion that Amaranth’s excessive speculation in the summer of 2006 caused purchasers of natural gas to pay more for delivered natural gas that winter?
There is certainly no evidence of that cited in the CFTC’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. And it is hard to believe there would be much
evidence of that. If the reports that summer had anticipated an ample
supply of natural gas in storage, and the forecasts for the hurricane
and winter seasons were both expected to be mild, it is difficult to believe that anyone would have had to pay more than they should have
for delivery of natural gas that winter. And if they did not have to
pay more than they should have, there is no evidence that any artificially inflated costs were passed on to their customers. Here, too, the
CFTC cites none in its notice; nor do they cite to any such data on the
senate staff report.
That is not to say that there could not have been any such evidence. But the CFTC notice makes no mention of the pricediscovery effect of arbitrage, which is the process by which traders

119

Simon Romero, Natural Gas: Big Worry This Winter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/business/15natgas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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seek price discrepancies for equivalent goods in different markets.120
Given advances in technology, traders today can quickly detect
whether future pricing for natural gas, or any other physical commodity, is too high or too low by comparing pricing for similar products.
Thus, for example, a natural gas trader would look at pricing for natural gas in other parts of the world, as well as prices for comparable
products in the United States, such as heating oil, to identify pricing
discrepancies and opportunities to profit through arbitrage. And because of the computerized sophistication by which such trading takes
place today, it is difficult to imagine pricing anomalies like those created by Amaranth lasting very long. Indeed, because Amaranth’s bet
was so extraordinarily large and risky, it only took about a month or
two before natural gas prices fell enough by September 2006 that
Amaranth itself collapsed, losing $6 billion.121
Perhaps the best example of the dubious nature of the CFTC’s
theory of “excessive speculation” causing prices to rise is explained
by what happened to the German firm Metallgesellschaft (“MG”).122
In the fall of 1993, MG’s United States affiliate purchased near term
long positions in heating oil on the NYMEX and in over-the-counter
swaps equal to forty-three times the daily production of Kuwait.123
No one before had ever amassed a speculative long position that
large.124
But MG’s speculative oil trading, as massive as it was, did not
move oil prices higher. This is because MG’s massive long position
did not fundamentally alter actual physical supply or demand. However, on Thanksgiving 1993, when OPEC oil ministers were unable
120
Hiren M. Maniar, Price Discovery and Arbitrage Between Futures and Cash MarketsA Case Study on National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), 24 FIN. INDIA 929 (2010), available at http://www.larsentoubro.com/lntcorporate/pmiv/pdf/Journal_Paper_1.pdf.
121
S. REP. NO. 111-360, at 166 (2010).
122
GEOFFREY POITRAS, RISK MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES
58-60 (2002).
123
Id. at 58-59.
124
Id. at 58. Ironically, MG took the position that its huge near-term long position was
actually a bona fide hedge because it had entered into a series of ten-year fixed price contracts for the sale of heating oil and gasoline. However, most of those contracts did not call
for the actual delivery of any oil products until the end of the ten-year term, and if at any
time during that ten-year period the market price of such products exceeded the fixed price
in the contracts, the customer could cancel the entire contract and receive a cash payment
equal to the difference between the spike price and the fixed price times the total amount of
product not delivered. Because MG gave away these contracts for free, they were widely
criticized as mere excuses to speculate, resulting in the largest speculative oil futures position in history.
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to agree on a quota to restrict production, which obviously did have
an impact on anticipated supplies, near term oil prices fell by about a
$4 a barrel, from about $19 to $15 – which was enough to cause MG
to suffer margin calls it could not afford to meet.125
Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible that in certain markets there might be price stickiness where, because “excessive speculation” has inflated a price, other related pricing remains stuck at artificially high levels notwithstanding the existence of arbitrage. It is
also possible that absent manipulation and position limits, speculators
competing with one another could themselves create a feeding frenzy,
creating commodity bubbles where the rules of physical supply and
demand say they should not exist, and thus creating market volatility
which itself can be a problem.
That would presumably be the kind of investigation and finding on a market-by-market basis that the original provisions of the
CEA intended the CFTC to make. However, the CFTC, in its latest
notice of proposed rulemaking, cites the senate subcommittee’s report on Amaranth as proof that Congress intended to eliminate that
requirement, which may be difficult for the CFTC to sustain in
court.126
And even though the CFTC does not address it, there is a
well-recognized circumstance where aggressive trading by a single
trader, acting alone, can in fact move markets higher.127 This occurs
when a trader acquires a dominant position in the futures market by
controlling at least 50% or more of both the commodity’s near term
long positions and the actual physical commodity available for immediate delivery.128
The actual physical commodity available for immediate delivery is a term of art that refers to specific lots of the commodity
stored in exchange warehouses.129 Under the terms of every futures
contract traded in the world, the owner has the right, but not the obli125

POITRAS, supra note 122, at 60.
Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 43.
127
Tatyana Shumsky, At London Metal Exchange, Mystery Buyer Holds Bulk of LME
Copper, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748
703865004575648934244174898.
128
JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET
MANIPULATION 5 (2014).
129
CFTC
Glossary,
U.S.
COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/index.htm (last visited
May 2, 2014).
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gation, to make or take delivery of that commodity. 130 Most transactions, however, are cash settled, which means that the holder of a
long position will settle up his trade with the holder of a short position.131
Short sellers are traders holding contracts to deliver a commodity at a fixed price in the future, having previously “sold” the
commodity.132 As the contract matures, the short seller must either
match his trade with that of a long seller, and cash settle the difference in price or the short seller can purchase the physical commodity
from someone holding the commodity in an exchange warehouse.133
Normally, there is no problem. But when an aggressive trader
does what the Hunt Brothers did, i.e. buys a large number of long positions, and when contracts mature, rather than cash settling, instead
takes physical delivery of the commodity. And, then continues buying long positions but this time refuses to make the physical commodity available to short sellers, the market is being squeezed.
When short sellers are squeezed in this fashion, the dominant
trader is able to extract an artificially high price to close out his long
trades.134 There is no question that such speculative trading, if allowed to continue, will drive up prices artificially and thereby force
consumers to pay higher prices.135
But are mandatory position limits the answer?
When a trader singlehandedly uses his market power over
both near-dated long futures positions and ownership of the physical
commodity to demand supra-competitive prices from short sellers,
such conduct violates both the anti-manipulation provisions of the
CEA and Section 2 of the Sherman Act’s provisions.136
130
See generally Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, What are “Contracts of Sale of a
Commodity for Future Delivery” Within Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1 et seq.), 182 A.L.R. FED. 559 (2002).
131
How Futures Work, NYSE EURONEXT, https://nyse.nyx.com/education/all-aboutinvesting/futures/how-futures-work (last visited May 2, 2014).
132
Reem Heakal, Futures Fundamentals: How The Market Works, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/futures2.asp (last visited May 2, 2014).
133
William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in A Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 917-19 (2005).
134
Kevin A. Crisp, Giving Investors Short Shrift: How Short Sale Constraints Decrease
Market Efficiency and A Modest Proposal for Letting More Shorts Go Naked, 8 J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 135, 151 (2008).
135
Bill Zielinski, Understanding How a Short Squeeze Can Cause a Stock to Soar,
ANSWERS, http://investing.answers.com/investing-101/understanding-how-a-short-squeezecan-cause-a-stock-to-soar (last visited May 2, 2014).
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Vandenberg & Feliu LLP, Comments of Vandenberg & Feliu LLP on Proposed Rule

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [2014], Art. 5

586

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

In other words, there is already a remedy for this situation.
What is more, the CFTC already has the ability to monitor those
holding large long positions in particular commodities as well as
those owning physical commodities stored in exchange warehouses
and can, if doing its job, bring legal action to enjoin traders seeking
to squeeze the market.
V.

THE LME’S ALTERNATIVE TO POSITION LIMITS

If the CFTC believes that there is not enough regulatory oversight, it might wish to take a look at what the London Metal Exchange (LME) does.
The LME has no position limits, but it employs what is called
“lending guidance” to prevent dominant traders from using their
market power to extract “supra competitive” prices from short
sellers.137 Under the LME’s regulatory regime, lending guidance is
triggered whenever a trader holds 50% or more of a near term long
position and ownership of stocks in the warehouse.138 Such traders,
in such circumstances, are required to “lend” their physical stocks to
short sellers at a fraction of the prevailing premium.139 The fraction
decreases as the percentage ownership increases to the point where
once the 90% threshold is reached, the trader must “lend” his physical stocks to short sellers without receiving any premium at all.140
In other words, the LME’s guidelines are intended to gradually eliminate any market power a dominant trader may hope to acquire.
The LME’s lending guidelines were developed only about ten
years ago.141 Prior to their adoption, the LME would look at pricing
on its markets and impose limits whenever it thought there might be

change To List and Trade Shares of the JPM XF Physical Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE
Arca Equities Rule 8.201, at 8 (May 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca2012-28/nysearca201228-1.pdf.
137
Thorsten Schier, LME chief says lending rules robust enough to prevent disruption,
AMM (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://www.amm.com/Article/2724920/LME-chief-sayslending-rules-robust-enough-to-prevent-disruption.html.
138
Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Lending Guidance for LME Metals, LONDON METAL EXCHANGE
4 (Dec. 15, 2005), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/meta
lmarkets032510_ohegarty2.pdf.
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Id.
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Id.
141
Id. at 1.
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abuses taking place.142
Specifically, the LME would monitor levels of backwardation. Backwardation is what occurs when the near term prices for future delivery of a commodity exceed the prices for delivery of that
same commodity later in time.143 When a market is being squeezed,
near term prices can rise dramatically, thus increasing the backwardation.144
The LME’s response, when that occurred, was to impose arbitrary limits on the level of backwardation.145
The problem with that arbitrary approach, however, was that
not all backwardation results from squeezes. Thus, backwardation
can occur when there is a temporary disruption in supply, thus causing prices for immediate delivery of a commodity to spike. When
that occurs, holders of long positions stand to profit, of course, but
such profit-making is not only legitimate, but the near-term higher
prices will, at least in theory, encourage producers to make more of
the commodity in order to satisfy the near-term demand. The result
is that supply and demand will eventually be back in balance. The
problem with the LME’s approach was that arbitrarily limiting the
backwardation, absent proof of a squeeze, could undermine the normal forces of supply and demand that would incentivize production
of more supply.
Hence, the LME came up with the idea of its lending guidelines.146
The LME has made clear that it believes its lending guidelines
offer a much better approach than position limits.147 However, the
142

WIKIPEDIANS, DERIVATIVES 153.
Id.
144
Backwardation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/backwardation.asp
(last visited May 2, 2014).
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O'Hegarty, supra note 138, at 2.
146
Id. at 1.
147
Id. at 2. The LME’s lending guidance is not without its own flaws, though. Thus, for
example, as LME warehouse stocks decline, the LME becomes more and more vulnerable to
a squeeze, as it takes much less metal to squeeze the market. Furthermore, not all metal capable of immediate delivery to satisfy a short position, and thus avoid a squeeze, may be
found in LME warehouses, which tend to charge substantially higher rental storage costs
than non-LME warehouses. If LME-grade metal is stored in lower cost non-LME warehouses, e.g., at a smelter’s storage facilities, such metal may be used to squeeze the market
and, because such metal outside of LME warehouses is not counted in determining LME
lending guidance, traders who accumulate such metal in these locations can, at least in theory, successfully squeeze the market. The only practical limit at present on such conduct is
the cost.
143
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LME is not about to criticize the CFTC for insisting instead on position limits.
One reason may be that the LME competes with United States
exchanges in the sale of metals and the prospect of mandatory position limits for United States exchanges may put the United States exchanges at a competitive disadvantage.
The reason is that once the United States mandates position
limits for speculators, the United States must simultaneously get into
the business of regulating exemptions from such limits for so-called
bona fide hedgers.
In the old days, hedgers were anyone actually engaged in the
physical commodity business that was seeking to shift a price risk.
All a hedger had to do to show that it was entitled to an exemption
from position limits was produce a copy of a contract requiring it to
make or take physical delivery of a commodity.148
Today, however, it is not so easy to identify who is hedging.
Indeed, many traders operate physical trading businesses, but because
of the complex algorithmic way in which certain hedging schemes
are implemented, it can sometimes be impossible for traders to match
their futures trading, lot-for-lot, with their actual physical trading.
Thus, for example, a merchant in the energy business may decide to
hedge its obligations to deliver United States heating oil by purchasing European gasoil; or the same merchant may feel that its risks are
best hedged by purchasing a crack spread, which may be a short or
long-dated long contract for West Texas Intermediate Oil and a short
or long-dated short contract for No. 2 heating oil.
In other words, there are many different ways in which a party
may decide to hedge and a regulatory regime which imposes position
limits, but provides hedge exemptions, must be able to differentiate
between legitimate hedges and subterfuges designed to speculate.
Once again, MG offers a case in point. Back in 1993, the
NYMEX had position limits for speculators.149 MG, however, wanted to be exempt from such limits on the ground it was “hedging.”
The purported basis for its hedge exemption was its having entered
into ten-year contracts with consumers to sell gasoline and heating oil
at fixed prices, but under terms by which the consumers did not have
148
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(Jan. 14, 2010), available at
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to take any delivery until thirty days prior to expiration of the tenyear term.150
In the meantime, if at any time during the ten year period the
price of gasoline or heating oil exceeded the fixed price in the contract, the consumer could sell back the contract and receive the difference between the actual price and the fixed price, multiplied by the
total amount of gallons that otherwise would be delivered. Consumers paid nothing for these “contracts,” but MG used them to obtain
hedge exemptions entitling them to be excused from position limits
intended to curb speculation.151 That these contracts were mere pretexts by which MG was allowed to engineer one of the biggest oil
speculations in history went unnoticed by NYMEX, which unwittingly blessed these exemptions.152
The problem, in other words, is that once you impose position
limits, you must also allow for hedge exemptions and it is difficult to
imagine how the government could administer such a regime without
either erring on the side of granting such exemptions in almost every
case, not wishing to second-guess a company’s hedging strategy or,
alternatively, the government refuses to grant the exemption, in
which case a legitimate price risk may not be capable of being shifted. If that occurs, there is the very real prospect that consumers will
have to pay higher prices to compensate the seller for the risk it could
not hedge that prices might rise, or, alternatively, as suggested earlier,
a new market emerges in which hedge exemptions themselves are
bought and sold, and such costs are likewise passed on to consumers
Yet the CFTC insists that position limits are the answer. It
has promulgated a rule change, for the second time, hoping that it has
addressed the concerns raised by the court that struck down its position limits proposal last year, and given the controversy raised by the
proposal, it is virtually certain that the revised rules will again be
challenged legally and the CFTC will have to justify why it believes
it is legally entitled to mandate position limits in the absence of any
empirical evidence demonstrating that they are either necessary or
appropriate to address any real problem in the futures markets. How150

MARK WAHRENBURG, HEDGING OIL PRICE RISK: LESSONS FROM METALLGESELLSCHAFT
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ever, it may be time to take a closer look at whether such regulation
is really needed and whether there are other more surgical remedies
that the CFTC may wish to consider implementing instead.
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